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Abstract 
 
In this work we present a pedagogical introduction to the minority game and various new 
versions of it with interesting properties, focusing in its applications in socialphysics. For 
instance, some systems display a kind of social behavior that seems to play an important 
role in the advancement and survival of an organized society [see, for instance, J. B. Silk et 
al., Science 302, 1231 (2003)]. On the other hand, devious behavior may degrade a 
organized society specially when anti-social individual patterns becomes common to many 
members of a collectivity. In a, perhaps, somewhat far fetched application of a model for 
interacting agents, the well known minority game, applicable in many contexts, we have 
studied by computer simulation the effect of having a fraction of the members of a 
collectivity endowed with spurious strategies. In particular the so called advantage law, 
where there are some agents that always win, no matter if they play good or not, and 
another one is a realization of a popularly known “crab effect”, where better performing 
agents may be suppressed by the mass of the medial players. As may be expected, this 
antisocial strategies deteriorate the collective organization of the system, but now studied 
within a measurable framework. In another application, positively minded, of the multi 
choice minority game we introduce different ways to reward also second place winners and 
compare the results with the one of the standard MG. 
 
Mail addresses: joergmenche@gmx.de ; almeida@df.ufpe.br 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE MINORITY GAME 
 
 The minority game is a very simple model of interacting agents, nevertheless it can 
be applied to various real situations and shows fascinating properties. 
 
A. The Standard Minority Game (SMG)  
 
 The main idea of the SMG with two choices is the following an odd number of 
selfish players repeatedly has to choose one out of two possible actions. For example: 
• buying or selling at the stock market 
• taking the bus or the metro to the university 
• 0 or 1 on a computer 
 
 All the players take their choice and then we count the players that decided to play 
’0’ and the ones who played ’1’. The players that are in the minority side will win the 
game. 
 Let’s go into the details now. We have N(odd!) players in the game, let’s say N = 
101. The only global information about the state of the game lies in a “history” or 
“memory” of length m of the last m games’ winners. There are two possible values (0 or 1) 
for each of the m entries of the history, so there are  2m possible different histories. Every 
player is equipped with a set of S strategies to determine their next choice. As the decision 
depends on the current history of the last games, these strategies contain 2m values, each of 
them representing the choice for one of the possible histories. All of 
the  2m entries can be 0 or 1, so there are  different strategies. Following we show an 
example for a history of length m = 5. 
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.1(b) we scaled various system sizes into a single graph using a 
ll 2 m /N = α. For α > α c ≈ 0.34 the system displays a cooperative 
α < α c) the coordination of the agents is worse than the one of a 
random system” consists of agents that make their choice by coin 
toss, without using any strategy (horizontal line in fig.1b). This behavior can be explained 
using the formalism of spin glasses. In the cooperative phase the introduced spin variable is 
frozen, the system becomes predictable. 
  
B. The Multi Choice Minority Game (MCMG) 
 
 The introduced Minority Game can be easy generalized to more than two options. 
The qualitative behavior stays the same (see figure 2), if we don’t change the rules… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. THE SILVER MEDAL 
 
 So let’s modify the rules a little and see what happens! Our idea was to make the 
Minority Game a little bit fairer. As in real life it’s sometimes also O.K. to get the second 
place. W4e found three different ways to implement this in the Minority Game. 
 
Model 1 
 
 Every agent is equipped with S normal strategies like in the standard Minority 
Game. We the round is over we will compare our strategies with the result of the game. If a 
strategy predicted the right result it will be rewarded with f (for first place) points. If the 
strategy didn’t predict a first place, but at least a second place, it will be rewarded with s 
(for second place). Therefore the maximum amount of points a strategy can win per round 
is f. 
Model 2 
 
 Every agent is equipped with S strategies that make two predictions at one time, one 
for the first place and one for the second place. The agents will always use the prediction 
for the first place to make their choice. If a strategy made a right prediction for the first 
place, it will be rewarded with f points. If it made a right prediction for the second place, it 
will be rewarded with s points. Because the strategies make two predictions they can get f + 
s points here. How did we implement this? As in the standard Minority Game the 
predictions of the strategies are based on the history of the game. So we introduce a 
separate history m2 for the second places, of the m last rounds. The strategies make their 
prediction for the second place based on this history m2. 
 
Model 3 
 
 Model 3 is almost the same as Model 2, however, there’s a slight difference in the 
implementation that leads to notable differences in the results: 
Instead of introducing an own history m2 for the second places the strategies will make their 
prediction for the second place based on the history m1. So in this case the plus on 
information that is given to the players is less. 
 
A. Results 
 
 Figure 3 shows the results of our simulations. In the uncoordinated phase (m ≥ 4, in 
fig. 3(a)) there’s no difference, all the curves fall on one. For smaller values of m, however, 
there’s a big difference.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 3: MCMG: 3(a) shows all the models together in a σ vs. 
m plot (N = 501) 
3(b)-3(d) show the models in a σ 2/N vs. 3m/N plot; 
parameters: S = 2; R = 10000; 100 independent runs 
 
 The results of model 1 are invariant under introducing a reward s for the second 
place. The models 2 and 3 on the contrary show a significantly improved performance for s 
6= 0. In these cases the phase transition of the MG is suppressed and the system remains in 
the correlated phase. We find this very interesting, because it means that the overall 
performance of these systems is much better, and one may tentatively say “more 
information available better performance”. They show only small fluctuations around the 
optimal value of Nmax. In the sense of the global win of all agents they are therefore more 
efficient, because more agents win at the same time. In figures 3(b)-(d) we show the scaled 
curves of our models. For model 2 we had to go to very high values of N to make the phase 
transition appear (≈10000). 
 
 
III. THE ADVANTAGE LAW 
 
 
 The advantage law is a popular brazilian saying (in portuguese lei da vantagem or 
lei de Gerson, see appendix A), applied whenever someone tries to overcome others at the 
expenses of their rights. A simple example: overtaking others in a queue. It happens to us 
every day that somebody tries to take an advantage. There are numerous occasions where 
some especially “clever” people look only for their own good and therefore break the rules. 
We introduced this idea into the Minority Game and implemented it in two different ways. 
 N players are playing the Minority Game as usual. The maximum of points to be 
distributed is 
2
1max −= NN , they are the resources of the system. Now we introduce an elite 
that “eats” a part k of the available resources. We implemented two realizations of the idea. 
 
Model 1 
 
If the total number of winners Nwin plus the k “clever” players exceeds the for everyone 
available resources (Nwin + k > Nmax) the members of the group Nwin become looser. 
 
Model 2 
 
If the total number of winners Nwin + k exceeds the available resources (Nwin + k > Nmax) the 
agent’s strategies will only win 1max <+ kN
N
win points, instead of 1. 
 
 
A. Results 
 
 Figure 4(a) shows the standard deviation vs. memory for model 1 for k = 0, 4, 6, and 
10 which for the number of agents considered is approximately the percentage of “clever” 
agents in the system. Clearly the overall performance of the adaptive system becomes 
worse as soon as k is different from zero. By depriving the normal players of their reward 
the extra agents increase the fluctuations in the number of agents in the minority side thus 
favoring higher fluctuations and this happens for any concentration of the extra players for 
model 1. At about 10% of their presence the averaged standard fluctuation is always above 
the random coin tossing case (horizontal line in the graph) and there is no longer a optimum 
distribution (minima for σ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4(b) shows the standard deviation vs. memory for model 2 for k = 0, 5,10 and 
20. Clearly the overall performance of the adaptive system is again worse as soon as k is 
different from zero and again depriving the normal players of their full reward, the extra 
agents increase the fluctuations in the number of agents in the minority side thus favoring 
higher fluctuations, ie., a large spread in σ, and this happens for any concentration of the 
extra players for model 2. In this case for low memories their presence may improves 
somewhat the performance (which always a bad one) but at high memory values for all k 
considered the system performs worse than the random coin case.  
 
 
IV. THE CRAB EFFECT 
 
 The crab effect is also a popular brazilian saying (see appendix B to see how Chico 
Science describes the crab effect in two of his songs). A society that pulls the successful 
down, just as the crabs in a cooking pot. Some crabs manage to reach the top and almost 
succeed to get out of the boiling water but the other crabs pull them back... Some 
individuals disorganize the whole system in order to achieve personal advantages. 
 We implemented the crab effect as follows: during the game the strategies of the 
players i gain points Psi. Better players have strategies with more points. So we simply cut 
the points of the strategies, when they exceed a certain limit. This limit is set by the 
medium Pmedium of all the player’s strategies. If a strategy has more points than the average 
of all strategies multiplied by a parameter c, the points of this strategy will be reset to 
Pmedium. 
 
Psi > c · Pmedium Î Psi = Pmedium 
 
 
A. Results 
 
 Figure 5(a) shows our results in an overview, whereas figure 5(b) gives more 
detailed informations in a 3D plot. Clearly the presence of “crab-like” behavior leads to 
disorganization in the system. For small values of c, which corresponds to a strong 
suppression of successful players the system becomes a system worse than that of pure 
random choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
  
   
 
FIG. 5: Crab effect: parameters S = 2; R = 10000; 100 
independent runs; 
 
  
 
V. CLOSING REMARKS 
 
 In this paper we gave a very short introduction to the Minority Game and presented 
some new versions of it. However the Minority Game has a lot more to offer. It asks 
challenging questions to statistical mechanics and its methods and ideas. Some say that it 
may come to play the same role in science as the Ising model, is applicable in many 
interdisciplinary subjects from physics to economy and biology to name a few.  
 The aim of this paper was basically to make you curious and to introduce you into 
the fascinating properties of the Minority Game. There are many things to be done in the 
area of “pure” physics as well as at the frontier to other disciplines. The best source for 
comprehensive and actual information is the website http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics, 
where the ever growing Minority Game community meats. For further information take a 
look at the references, where we listed some relevant papers and do not hesitate to write us 
an email. 
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APPENDIX A: A LEI DA VANTAGEM [2] 
 
Gerson, um dos grandes craques daquela espetacular seleção de 1970, a do Tri, teve a 
infelicidade de gravar um comercial para uma marca de cigarro que prometia aquelas 
maravilhas de sempre. O nosso “canhotinha de ouro”, como bom fumante, encerrava o 
comercial pronunciando, com aquele sotaque bem carioca, a frase: “gosto de levar 
vantagem em tudo, certo?” 
A maldição do comercial estigmatizou para sempre o nosso craque. “Gosto de levar 
vantagem em tudo” ficou célebre e virou slogan. Estava criada a Lei de Gerson, que serve 
at´e hoje para justificar os pequenos e grandes delitos que são cometidos diariamente em 
nosso país. 
Gosto de levar vantagem em tudo, certo? ERRADO !!! 
Quem nunca viu ou ficou fulo com essas situações? 
•O malandro que corta a fila no banco quando vê um amigo lá na frente 
•O “mano” passando por baixo da roleta do ônibus (nunca vi integrante de torcida 
organizada pagar passagem) 
•Centrais de Telemarketing que coletam doações para casas de crianças com câncer, 
velhinhos abandonados, etc; e que na verdade são estelionatários  
•E, do que temos mais medo, malandros que roubam e seqüestram pessoas, confiando na 
incapacidade da polícia e dos tribunais de investigar e puni-los, talvez com garantias 
(corrupção e troca de favores) ou mesmo sem elas.  
 
Acho que vale refletir um pouco sobre o assunto. Nossos políticos são denunciados 
diariamente pelo comportamento antiético no exercício da função pública. São dezenas e 
dezenas de casos escabrosos que chegam ao conhecimento das pessoas. Na maioria das 
vezes, nada acontece. Fica por isso mesmo e tudo acaba em pizza. Algumas CPIs são 
criadas, para a aparição de “Xerifes” e bodes-expiatórios têm prisão provisória, mas a 
imagem dos políticos, sindicalistas e policiais corruptos não se abala. Alguns poucos 
resultam em cassações de mandatos e retirada de candidaturas. E só. As fortunas 
construídas ilegalmente continuam nas mãos (ou em contas no exterior) dos donos. Ou seja, 
levaram vantagem a vida toda e agora, com dinheiro e poder (e parte da mídia) podem 
gozar a vida graças a impunidade nossa de cada dia. 
 
Policiais mal pagos que aceitam propina de traficantes poderosos, Fiscais que têm sérios 
problemas de vista e ficam ricos de uma hora pra outra, a Corrupção talvez seja o pior 
“produto de Exportação” de nosso país, e ela se deve (e muito) a essa condição de 
impunidade ao “Malandro”, onde os trouxas somos nós, mas talvez por corporativismo da 
“malandragem” ninguém se sinta ofendido. Afinal, O Coronel do Massacre de Carandiru, 
Euvírus Miranda, ACM, José Sarney, Garotinho e outros Coronéis são ídolos da “Massa” e 
campeões de votos. 
Essa cultura da malandragem e da esperteza está enraizada no nosso dia a dia. E é até 
incentivada na TV. O apresentador Pedro Bial, comentando o lance do pênalti no atacante 
Luizão na Copa 2002, em rede nacional, afirmou que “roubado é mais gostoso”. Uma frase 
infeliz, um mau exemplo para a formação da garotada. [. . .] 
taken from: http://www.aglioeolio.hpg.ig.com.br/cr006.htm 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B: CHICO SCIENCE AND THE CRAB EFFECT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
